In 2007 Madison Dearborn, Providence, TPG, Thomas H. Lee and Haim Saban's Capital Group jointly took Univision Communications private for $13.7B — the largest Spanish-language media LBO ever. $3.85B of equity went in. Thirteen years, one Televisa recap, one withdrawn IPO and one majority sale later, the consortium walked out with roughly $800M to split.
Read post →In March 2006 Bain Capital, The Carlyle Group and Thomas H. Lee Partners took Dunkin' Brands private from Pernod Ricard for $2.425B. A whole-business royalty securitization financed most of the deal, a December 2010 dividend recap returned $500M in cash, and by August 2012 Carlyle had fully exited. Inside the franchise-model LBO that threaded the 2008-2009 recession.
Read post →In April 2006 Bain Capital took Burlington Coat Factory private for $2.06B. Seven years later a $350M PIK dividend recap paid Bain a $336M cash dividend, an IPO priced above range at $17, and four follow-on secondaries at $25-$58 completed the exit. Here's how the off-price format threaded a cohort that mostly failed.
Read post →In October 2006 Bain Capital and Blackstone took Michaels Stores private for $6B at 11x LTM EBITDA and 7.8x leverage — the specialty-retail twin of a deal cohort that mostly ended in Chapter 11. Eight years, one $800M pre-IPO dividend recap and five secondary offerings later, the sponsors walked out at roughly 2x the money. Then Apollo took the same company private again.
Read post →In April 2007 Apollo took Realogy — Coldwell Banker, Century 21, Sotheby's International Realty, ERA — private for roughly $9 billion. Eight days earlier New Century Financial had filed Chapter 11. Six years, $3 billion in cumulative losses and a sponsor-led debt exchange later, Apollo exited at roughly 2x MOIC.
Read post →In October 2007 TPG and Silver Lake took Avaya private for $8.3B at $17.50 per share. Nine years later the company filed Chapter 11 and wiped the sponsor equity. Five years after that, the reorganized company filed Chapter 11 again and wiped the public shareholders. Inside the slow-motion LBO bust.
Read post →In 2007 Blackstone, Goldman, KKR and TPG jointly took Biomet private for $11.4B — the biggest medical device LBO ever and the archetypal four-sponsor club deal of the peak cycle. Nearly eight years, a 2013 markdown and a stock-and-cash merger with Zimmer later, the sponsors got their money back and modestly more.
Read post →In February 2007 Blackstone paid $39B for Equity Office Properties — the largest LBO of any kind to that point and still the largest real-estate LBO in history. Within three months it had already sold ~$27B of the portfolio. Inside the flip strategy that made Jonathan Gray's career.
Read post →In March 2011 TPG and Leonard Green took J. Crew private for $3B. Over the next nine years they extracted $766M in dividends and fees, pioneered the 'trapdoor' IP transfer that reshaped leveraged finance covenants, and still watched their equity get wiped in a May 2020 Chapter 11.
Read post →In February 1989 KKR closed a $25B take-private of RJR Nabisco — the largest LBO in US history, a record it held for nearly two decades. Over the next six years it fought a tobacco-litigation collapse, a 1990 debt crisis, a 1991 IPO, a Borden stock swap and a Nabisco spin-IPO. The sponsors came out at roughly 1x MOIC and under 1% IRR. Inside the deal that defined the industry — and the lesson it taught about scale.
Read post →In May 2006 six of the world's largest PE firms jointly took VNU private for €8.6B / $10.3B — the biggest media LBO in history. Six secondary offerings and 9.3 years later, they fully exited at a Bloomberg-estimated 29%-profit mark. Seven years after that, Elliott and Brookfield bought the same business back for $16B.
Read post →In February 2013 3G Capital and Berkshire Hathaway took H.J. Heinz private for $28B — the largest food deal in history. Berkshire wrote a $12.12B check for common, preferred and warrants; 3G wrote $4.12B for common alone. Both sponsors got 50% of the votes. Inside the capital-structure innovation that let Warren Buffett bankroll a mega-LBO without underwriting the operating risk.
Read post →In August 2006 Richard Kinder — sitting CEO — led a $22B take-private of Kinder Morgan alongside Goldman Sachs, AIG Highstar, Carlyle and Riverstone. Less than four years later he brought it back at the largest US private-equity-backed IPO in history, at a price above the filed range.
Read post →In January 2007 Joseph Neubauer, five PE sponsors, and roughly 250 senior managers took Aramark private for $8.3B — the second time Neubauer had led a management buyout of the same company. Seven years later Aramark re-IPO'd at a 135% paper return on the sponsors' cost basis. Inside the management-led coalition template that lets a founding operator keep control across two LBO cycles.
Read post →In October 2010 3G Capital took Burger King private for $4.0B, committing up to $1.5B of equity. Twenty months later a reverse merger with Bill Ackman's Justice Holdings SPAC returned $1.4B in cash and left 3G with 71% of a public company. Inside the deal that established the 3G operating template.
Read post →In August 2005 seven of the largest PE firms in the world jointly took SunGard private for $11.3B — the biggest tech LBO ever and the second-biggest LBO in history at that moment. A 2014 mid-hold spinoff, a 2015 sale to FIS at $9.1B, and a decade of illiquidity later, the club-deal template was ~1.5x MOIC — and quietly dead.
Read post →In December 2005 CD&R, Carlyle and Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity took Hertz private from Ford for $15B. They pulled a $999M dividend before the IPO, exited fully by May 2013, and left the public markets holding a company that filed Chapter 11 seven years later with $19B of debt.
Read post →In 2005 TPG and Warburg took Neiman Marcus private for $5.1B. Eight years later they exited to Ares and CPPIB at $6B for a 2.7x MOIC. Seven years after that, Neiman filed Chapter 11 with $5.1B of debt and Ares/CPPIB's equity was wiped.
Read post →In 2007 KKR and Stefano Pessina took Alliance Boots private for £11.1B — the largest European LBO ever and the first take-private of a FTSE 100 constituent. Seven years later they exited not via IPO but via a rare two-step strategic merger with Walgreens, worth roughly $9.3B in cash plus 227.7M WBA shares.
Read post →In July 2007 KKR closed a $7.3B take-private of Dollar General — bought at a 31% premium to a depressed share price. Just 2.5 years later the company IPO'd, and by March 2013 the sponsors were selling at $50.75 per share against a $22.00 cost basis.
Read post →In October 2018 KKR closed a $9.9B take-private of Envision Healthcare — a 10.9x LTM EBITDA multiple on an $8B-revenue physician-staffing platform. Five years later, after a COVID debt exchange, a 2022 uptier priming and a federal statute that repriced the entire business model, KKR walked away with zero in a dual-silo Chapter 11.
Read post →In July 2008, after 21 months of financing turmoil and a lawsuit against six banks, Bain and Thomas H. Lee closed the largest radio-broadcasting LBO in history — $24B in total transaction value on a $2B equity check. A decade later iHeartMedia filed Chapter 11 with more than $20B of debt, and the sponsors still roughly broke even.
Read post →In September 2007 KKR closed a $29B take-private of First Data — then the second-largest LBO in history — with roughly $22B of new debt. Eight years and a $3.5B emergency recap later, the company IPO'd below range. The real exit was a 2019 all-stock sale to Fiserv.
Read post →In August 2007 Cerberus paid $7.4B for 80.1% of Chrysler — the largest US auto LBO ever. Twenty-one months later the automaker filed Chapter 11 and Cerberus's equity in it was wiped to zero. The captive lender, sold separately to TD Bank for $6.3B, was the only reason the deal wasn't a total loss.
Read post →In 2015 BC Partners took PetSmart private for $8.7B, right as retail LBOs were going out of fashion after the Toys R Us disaster. Two years later, PetSmart paid $3.35B for Chewy — the largest e-commerce acquisition in history. Four years after that, Chewy IPO'd alone at $8.8B. Inside the deal that quietly became a masterclass in how to rescue a retail LBO by carving out an embedded asset.
Read post →In January 2008 Apollo and TPG closed a $30.7B take-private of Harrah's Entertainment — the largest gaming LBO ever. Seven years later the operating subsidiary filed for Chapter 11 with $18.4B of debt, an examiner reported $3.6-5.1B of colorable claims against the sponsors, and Apollo and TPG surrendered their remaining ~$950M of equity to secure legal releases.
Read post →In 2006 four sponsors took Freescale Semiconductor private for $17.6B — the biggest tech LBO in history. By 2009 the deal was on the edge of default. Nine years and one distressed debt exchange later, it ended in a stock-swap sale to NXP at roughly break-even. Here's what happened.
Read post →In November 2006 Bain, KKR and Merrill took HCA private for $33B — the largest LBO in history at the moment of close. Three 2010 dividend recaps returned $4.25B to sponsors before the IPO even happened.
Read post →Roll-up strategies aggregate fragmented industries (waste, dental, HVAC, dialysis) into platforms PE can exit at higher multiples. Inside the mechanic, why it works, and where it fails.
Read post →WeWork's 2019 S-1 introduced 'Community-Adjusted EBITDA' as a custom non-GAAP metric. Inside what it stripped out, why it ended up withdrawn, and how to spot creative EBITDA in PE diligence today.
Read post →Dell-EMC's 2021 VMware spin separated the deal's most valuable asset. Inside how Silver Lake structured the original 2016 buyout to set up a post-close value-unlocking spinoff.
Read post →Two famous LBOs from overlapping eras. One returned $14B in proceeds at 2.5x MOIC; the other returned zero. Inside what separated the outcomes.
Read post →PE sponsors return capital through dividend recaps, refinancings, and ultimate exits. Inside how Hilton and Toys R Us illustrate the full playbook from full win to full wipeout.
Read post →Hotels have predictable cash flow, real-estate collateral, and operational levers most sectors don't. Inside the Hilton playbook — franchising, unit growth, brand portfolio — that explains hospitality PE.
Read post →The Dell-EMC merger was underwritten on a storage + servers + cloud synergy thesis. Inside the realistic vs aspirational categories and what actually got realized.
Read post →Silver Lake partnered with Michael Dell to outbid pure financial sponsors on EMC. Inside the structural advantage of strategic + financial sponsor combinations.
Read post →Blackstone's IPO of Hilton in December 2013 was just the start. Inside the multi-year sell-down through 2018 and the Park Hotels and Hilton Grand Vacations spinoffs.
Read post →Debt service coverage ratio covenants set a hard floor under PE-backed companies. Inside how Toys R Us breached them and lost every refinancing option in 2017.
Read post →Reported EBITDA isn't what PE buyers underwrite. Inside the addback categories — non-recurring items, run-rate adjustments, management adjustments — that build the diligence number.
Read post →When Hilton went public in December 2013 at a $32B EV, capital flowed back to investors in a specific order. Inside the LP/GP/management waterfall that drives PE economics.
Read post →Blackstone paid 21.7x LTM EBITDA for Hilton in October 2007 — the peak of the cycle. Why the deal still cleared a 19% IRR despite the entry multiple.
Read post →Hilton ran more leverage than Toys R Us and survived; Toys R Us ran less and went bankrupt. Inside the EBITDA quality and cash conversion that determine real debt capacity.
Read post →Both Hilton and Toys R Us took LBOs in the late 2000s. One returned $14B; the other returned zero. Inside the structural differences between hospitality and retail PE.
Read post →Traditional banks wouldn't finance a $67B tech LBO. Silver Lake and Dell used $20B of DVMT tracking stock instead — an unusual structure that drew shareholder lawsuits.
Read post →Buying Hilton at peak multiples in October 2007 looked like a disaster by 2009. Inside the 2010 debt restructuring that saved the deal and unlocked the $14B exit.
Read post →PE returns decompose into leverage, multiple expansion, and operating improvement. Inside how Hilton's $26B → $32B journey split across the three drivers and what LP attribution analysts actually look for.
Read post →KKR and Bain extracted ~$470M in management fees and dividend recaps over 12 years while LP equity went to zero. Inside the mechanic that decouples sponsor and LP outcomes.
Read post →Silver Lake backed Michael Dell's $67B acquisition of EMC in 2016 — the largest tech LBO in history. Inside the structure, the DVMT tracking stock, and the 2.0x MOIC exit.
Read post →In 2007 KKR, TPG and Goldman took TXU private for $45B — the biggest LBO in history. Seven years later it filed for bankruptcy with ~$40B of debt and a wiped-out $8B equity check. Inside the natural-gas bet that broke it.
Read post →The 2005 Toys R Us LBO returned a 0.0x MOIC to LPs and ended in 2017 bankruptcy. Inside the $400M-a-year debt spiral that killed an American retail icon.
Read post →Blackstone closed the $26B Hilton acquisition at 21.7x EBITDA weeks before the 2008 collapse. Eleven years later it returned $14B in proceeds at a 2.5x MOIC.
Read post →Walk through a $500M sources & uses table with real tranches, plus three errors every junior PE associate makes — and the Toys R Us case study showing why one of them killed the deal.
Read post →Both numbers show up on every LBO slide. Here's what each actually tells you, and when to trust which — with the Hilton/Blackstone deal as the case study.
Read post →A handful of specialized recruiters control most of the on-cycle hiring at PE funds and hedge funds. Here are the 12 firms you should know, what each specializes in, and how to actually engage them.
Read post →